Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 3

Article 6

3-1-1992

BOOK REVIEW: Turning Right: The Making of
the Rehnquist Supreme Court
William E. Hellerstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
William E. Hellerstein, BOOK REVIEW: Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 913 (1992).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol58/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

BOOK REVIEW

David G. Savage, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE
REHNQUIST COURT (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1992)
Reviewed by William E. Hellerstein*

Diagnosing United States Supreme Court trends, most
would agree, is less than a precise science. Nonetheless, in Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Court,1 David Savage,

the Los Angeles Times Supreme Court correspondent, has made
a highly respectable effort at it. For the time span covered by his

book, his analysis of the Rehnquist Court's turn to the right is
largely accurate. Only the surprises in several of the Court's de-

cisions at the end of the 1991-92 term, a period not covered by
the book, have the potential to displace some of the trends iden-

tified by Savage, and for that he cannot be faulted; many experienced Court-watchers were caught off balance by the Court's

surprising finish. 2 Rather than diminish the value of Turning
Right, however, these recent developments actually serve to enhance it. That is because one can conclude that several of the

tensions between the Justices and certain decisional drifts that
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT, THE MLAKG OF THE REHNQUIST COuRT (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1992) [hereinafter TuRNaIN RIGHT].
2By wide acclaim, the decisions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), which reaffimed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
and Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), which struck down as an Establishment
Clause violation school prayers at a high school graduation ceremony, were significant
alterations of the Rehnquist Court's previous direction as to these issues. See Ronald M.
Dworkin, The Center Holds!, N.Y. REv. op BoOKS, Aug. 13, 1992, at 29; Al Kamen,
Center-Right CoalitionAsserts Itself, WAsa PosT, June 30, 1992, at Al; Marcia Coyle,
The Court Confounds Observers, NAT'L LJ., July 13, 1992, at 1. Also not to be discounted are the habeas corpus rulings in Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992), and
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), in which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy had some surprising things to say about the Court's rush to dismantle the Great
Writ.
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Savage highlights foretold, perhaps only slightly and probably
unwittingly, that something was afoot.
Turning Right is a well-written, intriguing, indeed entertaining account of the Rehnquist Court that begins in the summer of 1986 with the ascension of William Hubbs Rehnquist as
the sixteenth Chief Justice of the United States. It does not purport to be a scholarly work (there are no footnotes: mirabile
dictu!), but it is not a book for only the lay reader; serious students of the Court should not ignore it. Savage's synthesis of the
Court's major decisions each term is accurate in the main and is
thus helpful even to the scholar who focuses in sophisticated
depth on major doctrinal trends. Beyond that, there is suspenseful writing, an abundance of personality vignettes of the Justices, perceptive ironies, delightful turns of phrase and yes, some
3
good (though not Brethren-abundant)gossip.
Most enjoyable is the manner in which Mr. Savage has chosen to recount the story of the first five terms of the Rehnquist
era. In addition to organizing the material on a term-by-term
basis, he succeeds in creating great suspense (even for those of
us who know) as to the outcome of many significant cases. This
he accomplishes by proceeding not in a direct line from a
description of the case to the decision, but by interspersing the
backgrounds and personalities of the Justices and their prior approaches to the issues in question. Some, possibly those unfamiliar with the final result of a case, might find this method irritating. For those who remember the endings, Savage's manner of
presentation allows, in a goodly number of cases, for the brief
but enjoyable indulgence of thinking the result could actually
have turned out differently than it did. This sensation is enhanced by Savage's capacity to describe succinctly the background of a case and by his able use of oral argument excerpts.
Any attempt to understand the Rehnquist Court must begin
with an appreciation of the personalities that comprise it. In this
regard, there are no major surprises as to any of the Justices,
most of whom were subjected to intense scrutiny at their confirmations and have been ever since. But Savage gives us some
facts about the Justices that are less well-known and some personality shadings that are intriguing.

3 BOB WOODWARD

& ScoTT

ARMSTRONG, THE BRuTHREN

(1979).
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One would be hard pressed to dispute Savage's claim that
Chief Justice Rehnquist "stands as the unquestioned leader of
the Supreme Court and the most powerful American jurist since
Earl E. Warren retired in 1969.2 4 Unquestionably, Rehnquist
stands in stark contrast with his predecessor, Warren E. Burger,
both in terms of the strength of his intellect and his firmly
rooted ideology. What continues to distress is the unmitigated
depth of Rehnquist's hostility to civil rights, a hostility that Savage reminds us was formed early in Rehnquist's life.
Although Savage recounts that the Chief Justice is considered by many of his colleagues, including Justice Brennan, as
charming and self-effacing, he provides some less familiar facts
about Rehnquist's antipathy to civil rights progress in his earlier
years. For example, when Terry v. Adams, 5 the Texas White primary case, was before the Court, Rehnquist, then a clerk to Justice Jackson, wrote in one memo to the Justice that "I take a
dim view of this pathological search for discrimination... and
as a result I now have a mental block against the case." 6 In a
second memo he wrote: "It is about time the Court faced the
fact that the white people of the South don't like the colored
people: the constitution restrains them from effecting this dislike thru [sic] state action but it most assuredly did not appoint
the Court as a sociological watchdog to rear up every time private discrimination raises its admittedly ugly head." Fortunately, Savage reminds us, "Justice Jackson ignored the
advice." 8
Savage also describes how, in the early 1960s, when Rehnquist's adopted city of Phoenix was considering passage of a
public accommodations anti-discrimination ordinance (having
suffered embarrassment by the exclusion of Jews from one of its
premier hotels), twenty-six speakers appeared before the City
Council in favor of the ordinance and three opposed to it-the
first of whom was a self-described "lawyer without a client tonight"--Wiliam Rehnquist. Thus, as one of Savage's sources
opined, the Chief Justice's basic views were "flash frozen during
supra note 1,at 300.
5 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
6 TURNNG RIGHT, supra note 1, at 37.
7 Id.
8Id.
9 Id. at 31.
4 TuRMNG RIGHT,
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his younger days and have remained unchanged since then."10
Justice John Paul Stevens is described as an "iconoclastic,
intellectually superior jurist who has shunned the role of a
power broker,""- an image that is generally accepted. Less wellknown is what Savage describes as Justice Stevens's mild disappointment with the Court because he "expected his colleagues to
engage in an intellectual and principled search for the right solution in each case. Instead, they seemed to be more interested in
fitting cases into a liberal or conservative box."12
Justice Byron R. White, the only Democratic appointee still
on the Court, is portrayed as aggressive in demeanor but bland
in his writing: "Lawyers who have closely followed White's career over nearly three decades are hard-pressed to recall one line
from any of his hundreds of opinions."' 13 While this description
is not a surprise, Savage proffers a few items (and here one perhaps would appreciate knowing the sources) that are not common knowledge. For example, in explaining Justice White's hostility to the press, as manifested in cases such as Branzburg v.
Hayes 4 and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,"5 Savage suggests that it
can be traced back to the Justice's days "as a college football
star when a Denver Post sports writer stuck him with the name
'Whizzer White'.'

6

Indeed White, Savage tells us, hates any ref-

erence to his days as a football star (an important bit of knowledge for one arguing before the Court or even meeting the Justice socially). Relatedly, Savage also suggests that White was so
troubled by Bob Woodward's The Brethren,7 believing it to
have contained leaked information, that while normally reserved
Id. at 38.
n Id. at 62.
12 Id. at 63-64.
'8 Id. at 93.
124408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Court held that requiring reporters to appear and testify
before state or federal grand juries does not abridge the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment.
15 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The Court upheld an ex parte warrant authorizing a search
of a campus newspaper office for photographs of a violent demonstration. Justice White
rejected the paper's argument that the police decision to undertake a search rather than
proceed by subpoena violated the First Amendment. As Professor Gunther has noted,
Justice White's "opinion in Zurcher was as skeptical as that in Branzburg about press
allegations of chilling effects and risks to confidential sources." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1477 (12th ed. 1991).
16 TURNING RIGHT, supra note 1, at 157.
17 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 3.
10
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with his law clerks, he became "sphinx-like" with them.18
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor is described as possessed
neither of a "quick mind [n]or the verbal agility of Stevens or
Scalia,"' 9 but as "a hard worker, like White and Blackmun devoted to detail and intensely committed to the job,"20 with
whom there is "no 'Miller Time"' as one source put it.21 She is
also a Justice who22"avoids the ideological extremes of either the
right or the left.1
After Roe v. Wade,23 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, according
to Savage, "appeared to undergo one of the great transformations in Supreme Court history. ' 24 Although the Justice himself,
as do some of his clerks, maintains that the Court, and not he,
has changed, the record gives strong evidence to the contrary.
Savage's picture of the Justice is not an uncommon one: a hardworking but not great legal theorist who has "certainly lived up
to his pledge to be a protector
of the little people whose cases
'25
come before the Court.
The picture of Justice Thurgood Marshall traced by Savage
is bittersweet. He reminds us of the Justice's enormous achievements and the uniqueness of the background that he brought to
the Court as the country's first African-American Justice. But
the description of the Justice's last years on the Court is a disturbing one for those who hold him in high esteem. He is described as rude and abrupt and as a Justice who distanced himself from the. writing of his opinions. I do not know if this
portrait is accurate. If it is, one wishes it were otherwise.
Perhaps because so much has been written about Justice
William Brennan, Savage offers less here than about any other
Justice. Yet his description of the friendship between Brennan
and Rehnquist is an eye-opener. Justice Brennan is quoted as
saying about Rehnquist: "I liked him the first day I met him,
and we have been friends ever since."2 6 Savage also recounts

8 TURNING RIGHT,
19 Id. at 111.
20
21

supra note 1, at 87.

Id.
Id. at 115.

2 Id. at 116.
22 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24 TURNING RIGHT, supra note 1, at 233.
25 Id. at 234.
26 Id. at 362.
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that, according to Brennan, when Brennan's first wife was dying
of cancer, Rehnquist always offered words of kindness and support. The warm relationship between the two men is important
not only in understanding the Court as an institution, but as an
object lesson as to how individuals, despite deep professional
disagreements, should behave toward one another.
The chapter that introduces Justice Anthony M. Kennedy is
entitled "Mr. Clean.

' 27

But it contains little about the Justice's

background or personality that did not appear during his confirmation proceedings. This is a profile yet to emerge. The same is
true with respect to Justice David Souter, whose recent arrival
precluded Savage from telling us much, and with Justice Clarence Thomas, who makes his entrance as the book ends.
Not so with Justice Antonin Scalia. The Scalia presence
dominates the book. The strength of his intellect, his energy, his
irrepressible personality, his impatience with existing precedents
as well as with his colleagues, combine to make him both the
"enfant terrible" of the Court and the book's unwitting centerpiece. Scalia is portrayed as the ultimate literalist, a jurist for
whom "the law was an intellectual exercise, requiring him to figure out what the words meant or how conflicting provisions
should be reconciled. A sense of justice had almost nothing to do
with it." '2 8 Thus, Savage informs us, Scalia "was surprised that

the old liberals such as Brennan and Marshall still talked of being deeply troubled over cases. Sometimes the justice received a
late-night phone call asking whether the Court would agree to
allow a pending execution to proceed. None of this fazed Scalia.
His business was the law, not justice. He boasted to friends that
' A juicy tidbit this.
he never had problems sleeping at night."29
And a troublesome one.
Among the book's most savory segments are those which focus on the developing tensions among various Justices-the
lightning rod for which is, you guessed it-Justice Scalia.
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County,30 in which the Court upheld a voluntary affirmative action plan designed to increase the number of women working in
*1Id. at 167.
Id. at 106-07.

28

29 Id.
30

480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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traditionally male positions in the county's transit system, Scalia
began the first of a series of severe contretemps with Justice
O'Connor. Scalia, who has not been ambiguous about his hatred
of affirmative action, dissented and called for the overruling of
United Steelworkers v. Weber.-" O'Connor, whose vote was crucial, but who did not share Justice Brennan's view that actual
discrimination was not required to legitimate preferential hiring,
took the narrower position that such hiring was licit if employers
had a "firm basis" for believing that discrimination against
women and minorities had occurred. She characterized Scalia's
dissent as nothing more than "a useful point of academic discussion."32 Scalia retaliated by denouncing O'Connor's "firm basis"
criterion, calling it "something of a half-way house between leaving employers scot-free to discriminate against disfavored
groups, as the majority opinion does,''33and prohibiting discrimination, as do the words of Title VII.
The Scalia-O'Connor antagonism again surfaced in Thompson v. Oklahoma,34 which involved the execution of a fifteenyear-old. Only Rehnquist, White, and Scalia voted to uphold the
sentence. O'Connor wrote a narrow concurrence for reversal,
holding that because the Oklahoma legislature had not made
clear that it intended the death penalty to be inflicted on
juveniles as young as fifteen, the sentence could not stand. Savage tells us that Scalia, for whom the case was "easy," not only
"fumed" and attacked her opinion, but was also "irked at the
fact that it took O'Connor months to decide."35
The combat between Scalia and O'Connor surfaces in a
goodly number of other cases as well. For example, in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services36 Scalia's anti-abortion wishes
were not entirely fulfilled; O'Connor's refusal to join Rehnquist's
broad opinion reduced significantly the importance of the case.
Savage recounts: "Scalia was furious. O'Connor had done it
again. Just like the year before with the fifteen-year-old murderer, she had delayed and delayed, tested the political wind
3, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The Court held that not all "voluntary" afrmative action
programs violate title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 65.
3 Id. at 66.
3 487 U.S. 1230 (1988).
3TuRNiNG RIGHT, supra note 1, at 204.
36 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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Scalia denounced "O'Connor's re-

fusal to decide the broader issues [as] 'perverse' and 'irrational'
and said her reasons for sticking to a narrow decision 'cannot be
taken seriously'. ",38 So too in Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith.39 Scalia's majority
opinion held that religion-based conduct is not entitled to any
Free Exercise Clause exemption from general regulations and
that the government need not meet the compelling interest test
of Sherbert v. Verner.4 ° O'Connor refused to join Scalia's
broadly sweeping opinion, an opinion that appeared to be a real
sea-change in free exercise jurisprudence. She concurred in the
result, having concluded that Oregon's drug laws had met the
"compelling interest" standard. Yet she attacked Scalia's opinion for having virtually removed the religious liberty clause from
the Constitution.
To conclude that the relationship between Justices Scalia
and O'Connor suffers some strain, therefore, is not without foundation. Personalities aside, Savage attributes the stress to different approaches to constitutional adjudication: "Where law for
Scalia was an intellectual exercise, O'Connor worried about the
impact of a decision on real people. He sought decisions that
were intellectually consistent; she tried to be fair.

'41

Somewhat more puzzling than the Scalia-O'Connor relationship are the fissures that have appeared in the relationship between the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia. One would have assumed that here were two almost identical intellectual soulmates
who would march in virtual lockstep with one another. And the
fact remains that Scalia and Rehnquist do vote with each other
most of the time. But here is where Savage alerts us to a significant and much less obvious development.
In Morrison v. Olson,42 for example, Rehnquist authored the
Court's opinion that upheld the "independent counsel" provision of the Ethics of Government Act43 against claims that it
violated the Appointments Clause and the principle of separa-

37TURNING
38

RIGHT,

supra note 1, at 292.

Id. at 293.

39 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
40 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
41
42
43

TURNING RIGHT,

supra note 1, at 204.

487 U.S. 654 (1988).
28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (1978).
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tion of powers. Savage tells us that Scalia was so "livid" at the
outcome that in addition to penning a vehement dissent, he an4
nounced "that he intended to read much of it from the bench." '
Scalia, Savage recounts, "was also upset with the way conferences were run," often displaying vexation with "Rehnquist's obsession with efficiency.' 4 5 Apparently, Rehnquist in turn had
problems with Scalia: "Just as in their poker games, Rehnquist
talked too much. The frowns were
cast a frown on anyone who
'46
often directed at Scalia.'
Savage also excels at highlighting ironies that surface when
two independent principles of constitutional adjudication, to
which particular Justices subscribe, collide. For example, in California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra47 the
Court had to decide whether title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA") of 1978, preempted a California law that required employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy. Over the dissents of Justices White, Rehnquist and Powell, who maintained that the PDA language left no
room for preferential treatment of pregnant workers, the Court
held that the California law was not preempted and that it did
not violate the PDA. Savage neatly posed the irony "how would
a conservative Court grapple with a liberal state law?"' 3 The
conservative litany was to defer to the popular will reflected in
state legislatures. The Chief Justice, more than any other Justice, preached deference to the people's elected representatives.
On the other hand, some conservative Justices were not taken
with what they perceived as preferential treatment in
employment.
Savage is also adept at crystalizing a case or a particular

4 TuRNING RIGHT, supra note

1, at 201.
Id. at 203.
4"Id.
at 202. Rehnquist, according to Savage, was not the only Justice irked by
Scalia's loquaciousness:
Scalia's show did not always play well with the other justices. Several said they
wished he would be quiet for a change. On occasion, Byron White would glare
down the bench with a look that suggested he would like to put the newest
justice in a headlock if it would shut him up. Sandra O'Connor would barrunph slightly when he interrupted one of her questions.
Id. at 119.
47 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
48 TURNING RIGHT, supra note 1, at 70.
45
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Justice's approach. A gem occurs in his discussion of McCleskey
v. Kemp,49 in which the Court was confronted with perhaps the
most controversial issue in capital punishment cases-does evidence of racial disparity in implementation of the death penalty
invalidate it? By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that there was
neither an Eighth Amendment violation nor a denial of equal
protection in Georgia's enforcement of the death penalty, even
assuming a comprehensive study of racial discrimination in capital sentencing in Georgia to be valid. Justice Powell wrote the
Court's opinion, reasoning that the statistics did not prove any
discrimination in McCleskey's case. He observed that "[b]ecause
discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would
demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the
discretion had been abused." 0 Savage concisely sights the dilemma of the case: "For Powell, it was the worst sort of murder:
an unprovoked and deliberate killing of a police officer. If the
justices looked at Georgia's capital punishment system as a
whole, the case was a difficult one. The evidence of discrimination, even if unintended, was overwhelming. However, if they
cast their eyes only at Warren McCleskey, the case was easy. ' ' 1
Savage's treatment of the first five years of the Rehnquist
Court is very satisfying. He covers the Court's major decisions
on civil rights, abortion, free speech, and religion. If he comes up
at all short, it is with criminal procedure, where the coverage is
less extensive. Savage also is light-handed in describing the
Court's right-wing shift. Through deft assemblage of material,
he allows the Justices to speak for themselves and the reader to
feel the shifting of the ground beneath. His most opinionated
feelings emerge in the chapter detailing the defeat of Robert H.
Bork's nomination ("Robert Bork and the Intellectual Feast"). 2
At one point Savage describes Bork as having done "little scholarly writing," notwithstanding Bork's "public reputation as a
constitutional scholar." 8 But, even here, the presentation cannot be said to be terribly unbalanced.
Savage's final chapter, "A Court Transformed," is a skillful

49 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
50

Id. at 297.
TURNING RIGHT,

2

Id. at 133.

5' Id. at 134.

supra note 1, at 95.
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summary of the ground previously covered, but it provides little
uplift to a civil libertarian." Savage dismisses that constituency
with the reminder that "[u]nder the edicts of the Rehnquist
Court, the Bill of Rights is shrinking in significance,"' ' 5 and that
"[t]he protection of civil rights and civil liberties seemed to have
moved, at least for the time being, across First Street, from the
Supreme Court to Congress, just as William Rehnquist and his
Court had intended."56
If you fashion yourself a civil libertarian, your understanding of the Rehnquist Court's first five years will be enhanced by
reading Turning Right and you may even be the better for having read it. That you will be happier, I doubt sincerely. On the
other hand, if you are one who cuts the government greater slack
when it comes to the rights of individuals, you are, with some
slight interruption, in for a good ol' chop-lickin time. In light of
several recent developments, however, your enjoyment of the
landscape portrayed in Turning Right may be short-lived.
At the end of the 1991 term, several of the Court's most
important decisions signaled the emergence of a potentially centrist coalition consisting of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter. If this proves true, the three Justices, along with Justices
Blackmun and Stevens (and occasionally Justice White), will
give the Court a working majority that is positioned to apply the
brakes to any movement toward radical departures from established precedents, especially those that are protective of individual rights and liberties.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey5 the Court, by a 5-4 vote, reaffirmed the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade:58 that a woman has a constitutional right
to an abortion before the fetus reaches viability. A joint opinion,
a rare event in itself, authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter, stated that the right to an abortion was part of the
concept of liberty that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects. 59 To abandon Roe "under fire," said the
opinion, would hurt both the Court and "the nation's commit4Id.
at 451.
" Id. at 454.

58 Id. at 458.

57 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).

403 U.S. 113 (1973).
"9

112 S. Ct. at 2797.
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ment to the rule of law."'6 0 Thus, with Justices Blackmun and

Stevens in accord, the joint opinion preserved the core of Roe
for the forseeable future.
In Lee v. Weisman"' the Court reaffirmed its view that
state-sponsored prayer in public schools is prohibited, holding
that a prayer at a Rhode Island public high school graduation
exercise violated the Establishment Clause. The case was a great
surprise because recent decisions had led one to believe that the
Court was ready to lower the wall of separation between church
and state.62 Indeed, the Bush Administration's position that coercion should be a required element for an Establishment Clause
violation appeared to be a direct response to an invitation extended by Justice Kennedy in his dissenting opinion in the
Pittsburgh Christmas display case. 3
In Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU 64 Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and
White, strongly criticized the Court's religion rulings as manifesting an "unjustified hostility to religion."6 Indeed, he argued
for an overruling of those precedents and for permitting government sponsorship of religious observance as long as no one was
forced to participate and no "establishment" of a state religion
occurred.6 Not only did Justice Kennedy provide the key vote
in Lee, but he wrote the opinion that rejected the Administration's "coercion" argument.
In two habeas corpus cases, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy both took highly uncharacteristic positions that evinced
further resentment of their more conservative colleagues' desire
to make short shrift of the remains of the Great Writ, an interment process to which both O'Connor and Kennedy had previ60 Id. at 2798.
61 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
62

See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding a municipality's in-

clusion of a nativity scene in its Christmas display as not violative of the Establishment
Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the Nebraska legislature's
practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the state).
63 Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a freestanding display of a nativity scene on the main staircase of a county
courthouse, but upholding the display of a Jewish Chanukah menorah placed next to a
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty).
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
65 Id. at 602.
66 Id. at 655-67.
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ously made more than substantial contributions.
In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes 67 the majority held that the
court of appeals had erred in applying the "deliberate bypass"
standard, rather than the "cause and prejudice" standard, to excuse a state criminal defendant's failure to develop his claim at a
state court hearing. The defendant argued that he had not entered a knowing and intelligent plea of guilty to manslaughter
because the court interpreter had not properly translated the
mens rea element of the crime. Justice White's opinion stated
that, in light of prior decisions which held that the "cause and
prejudice" standard was applicable to the failure of a state defendant to appeal his conviction entirely, it was irrational to apply a less stringent standard to excuse the failure to develop his
claim factually in a state court hearing. Therefore, even though
a federal district court had deemed it appropriate to hear the
petitioner's claim, it was without power, White held, to conduct
a fact-finding hearing unless the petitioner could meet the cause
and prejudice standard.
Justice O'Connor, who consistently had been a major force
in the evisceration of federal habeas corpus, accused the majority of changing habeas law in a "fundamental way." She argued
that "the balance of state and federal interests regarding
whether a federal court will consider a claim raised on habeas
cannot simply be lifted and transposed to the different question
whether, once the court will consider the claim, it should hold an
' Justice Kennedy also dissented, arguing
evidentiary hearing." 68
that the Court should not take steps that would reduce the
chance that a federal habeas court will have accurate facts upon
which to base its decision.
Similarly, in Wright v. West 8 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy again turned a harsh pen against further demolition of the
habeas writ. This time it was directed at Justice Thomas's concurring opinion (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia), which articulated the newest Justice's desire to perform
further major surgery on the Great Writ.
The case had the potential to be a virtual coup de grace for
federal habeas corpus. The original issue was a narrow one:
67112 S.

Ct. 1715 (1992).

63 Id. at 1721.
"9

112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
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whether under Jackson v. Virginia70 the evidence was sufficient
to sustain the petitioner's larceny conviction. Subsequent to the
granting of certiorari,however, the Court also asked the parties
to brief another issue: should a federal district court continue to
give de novo review to a state court's application of law to specific facts-or, instead, should the rules be changed to allow a
district court to honor a state court's reasonable decision regarding mixed questions of law and fact? The implications of an affirmative answer to the second clause would mean a virtual
death sentence for habeas petitioners on such questions as
whether their confessions were coerced or their guilty pleas were
unknowingly entered; it would mean that federal judges would
have to defer to state courts on federal constitutional applications to mixed questions of law and fact, even when they believed that the state court had misapplied constitutional
principles.
What could have been a blockbuster case, however, ended
with a whimper because a majority of the Court (when its fragmented opinions were tallied) decided nothing more than the
original narrow question and held that under Jackson v. Virginia the evidence to convict was sufficient. Nonetheless, Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion called for an affirmative answer to
the broader question and he wrote extensively about his understanding of the Court's prior decisions, criticizing the Court severely for having misread its own seminal decision in Brown v.
Allen.7 1 For this he was strenuously denounced by Justice

O'Connor. She disputed Thomas's analysis of the Court's precedents and lectured him on his misunderstanding of the Court's
entire approach to the issue in question. Justice Kennedy also
challenged not only the soundness of Thomas's reasoning but
the logic of the result that Thomas sought. Irrespective of the
doctrinal aspects of the two habeas decisions, the strength of the
language employed by Justice O'Connor and to a lesser extent
by Justice Kennedy appears to denote more than just a disagreement on the discrete issues in the cases themselves.
The views expressed by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
70
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Souter in the abortion, graduation prayer and habeas cases, appear to disclose, in varying degrees, their distancing of themselves from their more conservative colleagues, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas, from especially the
quest of the latter three for further dismantling of precedents
they dislike. Although, as discussed earlier, some evidence of
these tensions surfaced in Turning Right, the degree of substantive displacement manifest in these decisions of the final days of
the 1991 term did not. One can only speculate as to whether
Justice Thomas's arrival and lack of "rookie" reticence has
served as a catalyst, whether the spirit of Justice Harlan has,
particularly in Justice Souter's case, acquired great strength, or
whether, indeed, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter have
been affected by the continuing influence of Justices Brennan
and Marshall.7 2 No matter what speculation one indulges in, the
Court is not quite the same as it was for the period encompassed
by Turning Right. As the 1991 term ended, Savage may well
have been within his rights to consider a sequel entitled Turning
to the Center. With the arrival of the Clinton Administration,
Savage may yet write a different sequel-TurningLeft (Again).
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